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Abstract
We propose location-then-variety competition for a multi-product and multi-store oligopoly,
in which the number of ﬁrms, the number of stores and their location, and the number of
varieties are endogenously determined. We show that as compared to price-then-variety
competition, location-then-variety competition with multi-stores yields a much richer set of
equilibrium outcomes, such as market segmentation, interlacing, sandwich and enclosure.
Keywords: multi-store ﬁrms, multi-product ﬁrms, variety competition, spatial preemp-
tion, natural oligopoly
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the most unsatisfactory aspects of the Hotelling’s (1929) model of spatial competition is
that it assumes that retail ﬁrms sell a single product. In reality, thousands of diverse goods are
sold in supermarkets and convenience stores, and quite a few varieties are even sold in specialty
stores. To this eﬀect, we assume that retail ﬁrms are able to sell any number of goods.
Another drawback of the Hotelling’s model is the assumption that ﬁrms establish a single
store. Multi-store ﬁrms are quite common in the retail industry nowadays. For example, there
are many chains of convenience stores, supermarkets, and fast food restaurants.1 We therefore
allow ﬁrms to establish multiple stores at diﬀerent locations in an oligopolistic market.
We introduce two kinds of heterogeneity: geographic and product heterogeneity. Geographic
heterogeneity is represented by the location of ﬁrms, which aﬀects the degree of local competition:
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1In Japan, the sales share of convenience stores in the retail industry steadily increased from 0.8% in 1985 to
5.4% in 2004. There were 41,114 convenience stores administered by 33 ﬁrms, which implies 1,246 stores per ﬁrm
in 2003. In addition, there were 34,762 fast food restaurants administered by 208 ﬁrms, which implies 167 stores
per ﬁrm.
1it is keen between neighboring ﬁrms, but weak between remote ﬁrms. Such location-related
competition has been dealt with address models of spatial competition in an oligopolistic market
in the literature.2
However, characteristic space is not necessarily analogous to geographic space. For example,
consider the case in which 12 ﬁrms are located equidistantly on the circumference of a circle. The
geographic interpretation is straightforward: consumers located at the 1 o’clock position prefer
ﬁr m1t o2 ,a n dﬁrm 2 to 3 on the basis of proximity. On the other hand, a characteristic inter-
pretation is not so obvious. Suppose an airline has ﬂights departing every hour. Some consumers
prefer ﬂight 1 to 3 and 3 to 2 because consumers’ preference is not necessarily monotonic. In
other words, there is no reason to use address models in the case of characteristic space. It may
be more appropriate to treat all varieties as more or less symmetrically substitutable by each
other. We therefore deal with geographic heterogeneity using an address model of oligopoly to
capture location sensitivity, whereas we treat product heterogeneity using a non-address model
of monopolistic competition according to Dixit-Stiglitz (1977).
The main objective of our paper is to propose an analytically tractable model of spatial com-
petition in variety, which is contrasted with that in price.3 The properties of price competition
are well known and reported in the literature. For example, competition is localized in that
prices of neighboring ﬁrms have a strong impact, and therefore ﬁrms do not locate close to each
other in order to relax price competition (d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979). It is
revealed in this paper that a similar property holds for variety competition. However, to deter
other ﬁrms from locating nearby, ﬁrms use price discounting in price competition, whereas they
increase the number of brands in variety competition. The former may depict competition be-
tween discount stores, in which prices are the crucial factor. On the other hand, the latter may
describe competition between convenience stores, between dollar stores, or between department
stores, in which variety of choice is important for consumers.
There are two reasons that price competition is not at work between chain stores. Dobson and
Waterson (2005) show that ﬁrms owning chains have a strong incentive to precommit to uniform
pricing because it softens price competition between itself and rival ﬁrms. They exemplify the
uniform pricing by Argos and Marks&Spenser in U.K., Zara in Spain, and IKEA in Sweden.
2Alternatively, this location-related competition could be interpreted as brand competition in the case of two
ﬁrms producing an operating system, such as Windows and Mac, with many software packages compatible with
either operating system. Consumers select only one of the operating systems together with a set of software
packages.
3de Palma, Lindsey, von Hohenbalken and West (1994) developed a single-stage variety game based on the
logit model. However, spatial competition was not taken into account.
2Another reason is resale-price maintenance. This is commonly used in practice: books and music
CD’s should be sold at regular prices in several countries like Japan. Given the constraint of
regular prices, these retail stores would strategically provide an array of varieties in order to
attract customers, while taking display costs of varieties into account. In fact, it is shown here
that variety competition yields richer market outcomes than those of price competition in a
spatial economy, and better explains real world behavior. In particular, ﬁrms establish multiple
stores in order to exercise spatial preemption, and the number of stores is not necessarily the
same between ﬁrms in location-then-variety competition, which never happens in location-then-
price competition (Martinez-Giralt and Neven, 1988).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A model of spatial variety competition
is presented in Section 2. A single-store duopoly of simultaneous entry and sequential entry is
analyzed in Section 3. This is extended to a multi-store duopoly of sequential entry in Section 4.
We show that multi-store variety competition yields a richer set of spatial conﬁgurations than
price competition. Section 5 concludes.
Related literature on multi-store spatial competition
There are few papers in the literature on multi-store spatial competition in comparison
with single-store spatial competition possibly due to the nonexistence of equilibrium mentioned
in footnote 4. A pioneering work on multi-store spatial competition was carried out by Judd
(1985) using a multi-stage game with entry and exit. Judd showed that a multi-store ﬁrm is very
vulnerable to a new single-store ﬁrm. Nevertheless, as documented by Dobson and Waterson
(2005), we often observe numerous chain stores together with an oligopolistic market structure
in the retail sector in the real world, which is consistent with our model.
A one-stage location game with multiple stores has been analyzed by Gabszewicz and Thisse
(1986) and Chisholm and Norman (2004). Two-stage price-then-location games have been ex-
amined by Martinez-Giralt and Neven (1988) and Janssen, Karamychev and van Reeven (2005).
The two-stage quantity-then-location game has been investigated by Pal and Sarkar (2002).
This paper considers a two-stage variety-then-location game with multiple stores.
2T h e m o d e l
Consumers are uniformly distributed on a unit segment x ∈ [0,1] with density 1.T h e r e a r e
two retail ﬁrms, R = A,B.F i r m R establishes nR stores r = r1,r2,...,rn R at locations
x = xr1,x r2,...,x rnR with xri <x r,i+1 for i =1 ,...,n R − 1,a n ds e l l svR varieties of horizon-
3tally diﬀerentiated goods in each store.4 Consumers visit only one of the stores, and purchase
(qr1,q r2,...,q rvR) units of varieties from multi-product store r. Their preferences are identical











where σ(> 1) is the elasticity of substitution between the varieties, and q0 is the numéraire
quantity.5 We normalize α =1by choosing a unit of the numéraire. A consumer who visits




prvqrv + q0 + τ (x − xr)
2 , (2)
where y is the consumer’s income, prv is the price of variety v at store r,a n dτ is the unit cost

















logvR − τ (x − xr)
2 + y0,
where y0 ≡ y − logp − 1 is constant. The utility of a marginal consumer is indiﬀerent between
visiting two neighboring stores r and s, located at xr and xs (xr <x s), respectively. Solving








4If ﬁrms are allowed to sell diﬀerent numbers of varieties depending on store locations, then the existence of
equilibrium in variety competition is not necessarily guaranteed. This is because the number of stores (na,n b)
that should have been determined in the ﬁrst stage can be decreased in the last stage of variety competition
by setting zero variety (i.e. selling no goods) in some stores. That is, since the number of stores cannot be
pre-committed in the ﬁrst stage, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is not well deﬁned. As shown in
Appendix A1, assumption of the same number of varieties always ensures the existence of equilibrium in variety
competition. The assumption is not unrealistic, because many chain stores, such as Seven-Eleven and Denny’s,
oﬀer almost the same array of varieties in each store.
5This utility function is often used in new economic geography (Martin and Rogers, 1995; Pﬂüger, 2004).
6In the case of department stores and shopping malls, price competition should also be involved. See Appendix







for xr ≤ b xrs ≤ xs, otherwise locating a store at xr or xs is not proﬁtable at all.
Retailing technology involves a ﬁxed display cost per variety f.W h e ns t o r er is located such




pqrv(b xrs − b xtr) − fvR
as long as the value is non-negative. Otherwise, ﬁrms do not open a store at location r.T h e






As a ﬁrst step, we consider a standard duopoly in which each ﬁrm can establish a single store
(nA,n B)=( 1 ,1) for simultaneous entry and sequential entry in this section.
3.1 Simultaneous entry
Consider the game in which both ﬁrms simultaneously enter and select store location (xa,x b)
in the ﬁrst stage, and both ﬁrms simultaneously choose the number of varieties (vA,v B) in the
second stage. We assume that ﬁrms enter the market only if proﬁts are positive. Following the
spirit of Hotelling, we seek an SPNE for a given parameter value β by backward induction.
In the second stage, given the locations of both ﬁrms xa and xb,e a c hﬁrm R maximizes πR
of Eq. (4) with respect to the number of varieties vR. Computing the ﬁrst-order conditions, we





2f (xb − xa)
for xa <x b. (5)
This is a unique Nash equilibrium in variety competition because concavity of the proﬁt functions
is assured. It shows that the number of varieties increases when the distance between ﬁrms
decreases. Such aggressive reaction in augmenting varieties acts as a dispersion force, just as
reducing prices is a dispersion force in price competition.











2 − xa − xb −
β2
xb−xa
´ for xa <x b, (6)
5where e πR (rs) is the proﬁto fﬁrm R having a single store r located to the left of a single store
s of a rival ﬁrm. If xa = xb, the proﬁts given by Eq. (6) are negative, implying that the
principle of minimum diﬀerentiation never arises. Put diﬀerently, ﬁrms avoid ﬁerce competition
in variety by locating apart. This observation is in accord with price competition identiﬁed by
d’Aspremont et al. (1979).
The proﬁts given by Eq. (6) decrease in β =1 /
p
(σ − 1)τ, which is interpreted as the
intensity of variety competition. In fact, when β is large, ﬁrms sell many varieties as shown
by Eq. (5) to attract consumers. Thus, variety competition is keen when goods are poor
substitutes and consumers look for variety (σ low), and/or when shopping trips are not costly
(τ low). However, the ﬁxed cost f is irrelevant to the proﬁts given by Eq. (6).
In the ﬁrst stage, each ﬁrm i maximizes proﬁt given by Eq. (6) with respect to location xi.





xj + β for xj ≤ 1/2
xj − β for xj > 1/2
for i 6= j. (7)
That is, each ﬁrm chooses a location with a larger hinterland at a distance of β from its opponent.
While the number of varieties given by Eq. (5) depends on the ﬁxed cost f, the location choice
given by Eq. (7) is independent of the ﬁxed cost. Inserting Eq. (7) into Eq. (6) yields:
π∗
A (ab)=x∗
b − β = x∗
a π∗
B (ab)=1− x∗
a − β =1− x∗
b. (8)
For these proﬁts to be positive, 0 <x ∗
a < 1 − β and β <x ∗
b < 1 should hold. We thus obtain
the following.
Proposition 1 For simultaneous entry of single-store duopolists, two cases may arise.
(i) When β ≥ 1, only one ﬁrm enters and locates at any point inside the line segment.
(ii) When 0 ≤ β < 1,t w oﬁrms enter and locate at
(x∗
a,x ∗
b)=( x,x + β) for x ∈ [max{0,1/2 − β},min{1 − β,1/2}].
Three remarks are in order. First, when the intensity of competition is strong (β ≥ 1),
both proﬁts in Eq. (8) cannot be positive, which implies that one of the ﬁrms monopolizes the
market. Such spatial monopoly is reminiscent of the natural oligopoly of Shaked and Sutton
(1983). Note, however, that the determinants of the number of ﬁrms diﬀer between their and
o u rm o d e l s .T h en u m b e ro fﬁrms is determined by the production cost structure in Shaked and
Sutton (1983), whereas it depends on the substitutability σ and the transport cost τ, but is
independent of the production cost f in our model.
6Second, when the intensity of competition is weak (β < 1), both ﬁrms enter the market,
and there is a continuum of equilibria with a distance of β between the them. A continuum
exists because the reaction functions of Eq. (7) for the two ﬁrms do not cross, but overlap for
all relevant values of (xa,x b). In any equilibrium, the locations of ﬁrms are always inside the
line segment, which is in contrast to the edge locations (Neven, 1985) or outside the segment
(Tabuchi and Thisse, 1995) in location-then-price competition. Casual empiricism suggests that
ﬁrms hardly establish stores at edges of or outside consumer distributions. Hence, location-then-
variety competition is able to describe the real world better than location-then-price competition.
Stated diﬀerently, the price competition eﬀect (a dispersion force) is so strong that it dominates
the market area eﬀect (an agglomeration force) that is generated by the demand segment (Fujita
and Thisse, 1996). On the other hand, the variety competition eﬀect balances with the market
area eﬀect, which yields the interior locations of ﬁrms.
Third, when the intensity of competition β approaches 0,b o t hﬁrms locate at the center
of the line segment, which is merely the location equilibrium of two ﬁrms (Lerner and Singer,
1937). That is, the one-stage game of location competition is considered as a special case of our
game when competition in variety is suﬃciently weak. Note, however, that when competition is
weak enough, we see in the next section that ﬁrms then open multiple stores.
3.2 Sequential entry
We next examine sequential entry of ﬁrms to reﬁne the continuum of equilibria that appeared
in the simultaneous entry game above. The game now consists of three stages: ﬁrm A selects
store location xa in the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm B selects store location xb in the second stage, and both
ﬁrms simultaneously choose the number of varieties (vA,v B) in the third stage.
The last stage of variety competition is the same as that for simultaneous entry. In the
second stage, ﬁrm B maximizes its proﬁt for its location xb given ﬁrm A’s location xa.W e
already know from Eq. (7) that ﬁrm B’s best locational reply is xb = xa +β given xa ∈ [0,1/2].
Inserting this into Eq. (6) yields the proﬁto fﬁrm A as πA (ab)=xa.F i r mA’s best locational
reply is therefore given by x∗
a =1 /2, and hence the equilibrium proﬁts are:
π∗
A (ab)=1 /2 π∗
B (ab)=1 /2 − β.
Thus, we have the following.
Proposition 2 For sequential entry of single-store duopolists, two cases may arise.
(i) When β ≥ 1/2,o n l yo n eﬁrm enters and locates at any point inside the line segment.
7(ii) When 0 ≤ β < 1/2,t h eﬁrst entrant locates at the center, while the second locates at
x∗
b =1 /2+β.
The market outcome is somewhat similar between simultaneous entry and sequential entry.
First, when the intensity of competition β is strong enough, the proﬁt π∗
B (ab) is negative, so
that “natural monopoly” arises. Second, when both ﬁrms achieve positive proﬁts, the locations
of ﬁrms are always inside the line segment. Third, when β approaches 0,b o t hﬁrms locate at
the center of the segment.
However, there are some diﬀerences between simultaneous entry and sequential entry. The
continuum of equilibria disappears in the case of sequential entry. For 1/2 ≤ β < 1,t h eﬁrst
entrant can monopolize the market in the sequential entry game, whereas this is not the case
in the simultaneous entry game. Put diﬀerently, natural monopoly is more easily realized in
sequential entry.
Furthermore, the locations of the two ﬁrms are asymmetric: while the ﬁrst entrant always
chooses the center, the second entrant selects a periphery. As a result, the proﬁts are also
asymmetric: the ﬁrst entrant earns more proﬁt than the second entrant. Such a ﬁrst-mover
advantage also prevails in location-then-price competition for two ﬁrms (Tabuchi and Thisse,
1995) and for more than two ﬁrms (Neven, 1987). We see in the next section that these ﬁndings
a r ea l s ot r u ew h e nﬁrms are allowed to open multiple stores.
4 Multi-store duopoly
W en o we x p l o r et h ec a s ei nw h i c he a c hﬁrm can establish multiple stores. For analytical tractabil-
i t y ,w ea s s u m e( i )t h a tt w oﬁrms enter sequentially, (ii) that ﬁrms can establish two stores at most
(nR ≤ 2), and (iii) that the store locations of the ﬁrst entrant are symmetric (xa1 + xa2 =1 ),
but the store locations of the second entrant can be asymmetric. The ﬁrst assumption is to
reﬁne the continuum of equilibria that appears for simultaneous entry of ﬁrms, as observed in
the previous section. The second and third assumptions are for analytical simplicity. Relaxing
these assumptions is possible, but the analysis becomes cumbersome without obtaining more
meaningful results. We instead focus on the implications and intuitions of location-then-variety
competition.
For notational convenience, we write (xr,x r) for nR =1 ,a n d(xr1,x r2) with xr1 6= xr2 for
nR =2 . The game in this section is as follows. Firm A selects the number of stores nA and their
locations (xa1,1 − xa1) in the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm B selects the number of stores nB and locations
8(xb1,x b2) in the second stage, and both ﬁrms simultaneously choose the number of varieties
(vA,v B) in the third stage. As before, we seek an SPNE by backward induction.
For example, if there are three stores a1, a2 and b located such that xa1 ≤ xa2 ≤ xb,w ed e n o t e
this conﬁguration by (aab) and its proﬁtb yπR (aab). Excluding axisymmetric conﬁgurations,
there are nine spatial arrangements:
(ab), (bab), (abb), (aab), (aba), (aabb), (baab), (abba), (abab). (9)
4.1 The third and second stages
There exists a unique equilibrium in the third stage of variety competition for any conﬁguration
in (9), as shown in Appendix A1. Since this is easily computed, we analyze the third and second
stages together in this subsection given A’s store locations (xa1,1 − xa1).B y s o l v i n g t h e t w o
stages in reverse, the proﬁts πR (•) of the nine conﬁgurations can be expressed as xa1 and β.
Single store (ab).W eh a v ea l r e a d ys o l v e dt h ep r o ﬁts in subsection 3.2 as
πA (ab)=xa πB (ab)=xa − β.
Sandwich by B (bab).W h e nﬁrm A establishes one store a at x = xa and ﬁrm B two stores















As before, the number of varieties is determined by the distance from rival stores. Although
single-store ﬁrm A oﬀers double of varieties, the total number of varieties is the same between
ﬁrms A and B. Straightforward computation yields that the best locational replies of B are,
respectively, given by:
xb1 = xa − β
p
1+l o g2 xb2 = xa + β
p
1+l o g2 . (10)







1+l o g2 .
Note that these proﬁts are not functions of xa, and that there exists a continuum of equilibria
for all xb1 ∈ [0,1 − 2β
√
1+l o g2 ]with Eq. (10).
























2β2 (1 − log2)
1 − 2xa1
.
Segmentation (abb).T h i si sn e v e rc h o s e nb yﬁrm B because the peripheral store b2 is imma-
terial. That is, the presence of b2 does not raise B’s revenue, but increases the costs of providing
another set of varieties.
Segmentation (aab). When the intensity of competition is relaxed, ﬁrm A has an incentive





2f (xb − 1+xa1)
and the best locational reply of B is given by:
xb =1− xa1 + β
p
1 − log2. (11)
Given this B reaction, the proﬁts are expressed as:




πB (aab)=xa1 − β
p
1 − log2.
Segmentation (aabb).A si nc a s e(abb), ﬁrm B never chooses this conﬁguration.













and the best locational replies for stores b1 and b2 are given by
xb1 = xa1 − β xb2 =1− xa1 + β.
Given these B reactions, the proﬁts are expressed as:
πA (baab)=1− 2xa1 πB (baab)=xa1 − β.













and the best locational replies are given by:
xb1 = xa1 + β xb2 =1− xa1 − β.
Given these B reactions, the proﬁts are:
πA (abba)=2 xa1 πB (abba)=1− 2xa1 − 2β.




















xb2 =1− xa1 + β.














The above reaction functions emphasize that the location decisions of multi-store ﬁrms are
dependent on each other in our model, while they are independent in the works by Pal and
Sarkar (2002) and Janssen et al. (2005) due to the diﬀerent types of spatial competition.
4.2 The ﬁrst stage
So far, we have shown that there are seven possible SPNE conﬁgurations. We now move to
investigate the ﬁrst-stage location of the ﬁrst entrant A as follows.
Single store (ab). We already know that given ﬁrm B’s reaction, ﬁrm A necessarily chooses a
central location in subsection 3.2. The proﬁto fﬁrm B is computed as π∗
B (ab)=1
2−β. However,
for this choice strategy to be feasible, ﬁrm B should have no incentive to open the second store




1+l o g2− 2
¢−1 ' 0.31.M o r e o v e r ,ﬁrm B should
have a positive proﬁt πB (ab) > 0,o rβ < 1/2. Hence, a candidate for SPNE is:
x∗
a =1 /2 π∗
A (ab)=1 /2 if 0.31 ≤ β < 1/2. (12)
Sandwich by B (bab).W h e n ﬁrm A establishes one store at x = xa, ﬁrm B locates two
stores at xb1 = xa − β
√
1+l o g2and xb2 = xa + β
√
1+l o g2 . For this choice to be feasible, it















if β < 0.31. (13)
Segmentation (aab).W h e nﬁrm A locates two stores at x = xa1,1 − xa1, ﬁrm B locates one
store at xb =1−xa1 +β
√
1 − log2, from Eq. (11). For this choice to be feasible, it is necessary
that
πB (aab) ≥ max{πB (aba),πB (baab),πB (abba),πB (abab)} πB (aab) > 0. (14)
11It can be readily conﬁrmed that there exists a non-empty domain that satisﬁes the inequalities


















1−log2 if 0.19 < β < 0.45.
(15)
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A (abba) and π∗
A (abab) as given by Eqs. (12) (13), (15), (16), (17), (18) and (19), respectively,
ﬁrm A selects the best number of stores and their locations. Tedious but straightforward com-
putations revealed that conﬁgurations bab and abba are not selected as an SPNE for any β,
while the other ﬁve conﬁgurations are selected as an SPNE, depending on β.I ns u m m a r y ,w e
establish the following.
12Proposition 3 For sequential entry of duopolists, ﬁve cases may arise.
(i) When 0.31 < β < 1/2, ﬁrm A establishes one store at the center xa =1 /2 and ﬁrm B
one store at xb =1 /2+β ∈ (0.81,1).
(ii) When 0.21 < β ≤ 0.31, ﬁrm A establishes two stores at xa1 ∈ (0.27,0.28) and xa2 ∈
(0.72,0.73),a n dﬁrm B one store at xb = xa2 + β
√
1 − log2 ∈ (0.84,0.90).
(iii) When 0.16 < β ≤ 0.21, ﬁrm A establishes two stores at xa1 ∈ (0.22,0.27) and xa2 ∈
(0.73,0.78),a n dﬁrm B one store at the center xb =1 /2.
(iv) When 1/8 < β ≤ 0.16, ﬁrm A establishes two stores at xa1 ∈ (0.27,0.28) and xa2 ∈
(0.72,0.73),a n dﬁrm B two stores at xb1 = xa1 − β and xb2 = xa2 + β.
(v) When 0 < β ≤ 1/8, ﬁrm A establishes two stores at xa1 ∈ (0.21,0.25) and xa2 ∈
(0.75,0.79),a n dﬁrm B two stores at xb1 =1 /2 and xb2 = xa2 + β.
Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 1. There are three remarks. First, observe that the
ﬁrst entrant opens one store at xa =1 /2 or two stores at (xa1,x a2) ≈ (1/4,3/4),w h i c ha r e
the socially optimum locations. Since more than half of consumers go to the stores of the ﬁrst
entrant, welfare losses due to the non-cooperative behavior of ﬁrms may not be as large.
Second, we might consider whether or not the ﬁrst entrant A can preempt the the second
entrant by opening multiple stores. It can be readily veriﬁed that such a multi-store monopoly
is not possible for any β < 0.5.F o rβ ≥ 0.5, spatial monopoly is possible, but only by a single
store, as shown in Proposition 2. Hence, multi-store spatial monopoly is never realized as an
equilibrium outcome in the setting of location-then-variety competition.
Third, the ﬁrst entrant always opens a number of stores greater than or equal to the number
opened by the second entrant. For example, in the segmented case (ii), while the ﬁrst entrant
establishes two stores near one and three quarters of the segment, the second entrant can locate
only at a periphery. This implies that spatial preemption is an eﬀective strategy for chain-
store ﬁrms. Whereas such spatial preemption rarely appears as an equilibrium outcome in the
literature on spatial competition, it is observed in many retail markets, which may vindicate our
spatial variety competition between chain-store ﬁrms.
The proﬁts of the two ﬁrms are illustrated in Figure 2. Both proﬁts are not monotonic with
respect to the intensity of competition β. However, we can roughly state that as the intensity of
competition increases, the proﬁt of the second entrant tends to decrease, while that of the ﬁrst
entrant does not. We can also observe that the ﬁrst entrant always earns higher proﬁt than the
second entrant. Thus, what is true for the single-store duopoly in the previous section is also
true for the multi-store duopoly.
13When competition is not intense (β small), both ﬁrms open multiple stores. The proﬁts
are not low compared to the case with large β because the intensity of competition is relaxed.
Hence, proliferating stores do not harm each other, i.e., the so-called prisoners’ dilemma does
not occur in variety competition. It should ﬁnally be noted that multi-store conﬁgurations never
arise in the location-then-price competition of Martinez-Giralt and Neven (1988).
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have examined the location-then-variety competition of a multi-product and multi-store
oligopoly, in which the number of ﬁrms, the number and location of stores, and the number of
varieties are endogenously determined. It was revealed that location-then-variety competition
with multi-stores can better describe the spatial conﬁgurations of the retail sector in the real
world, such as market segmentation, interlacing, sandwich and enclosure.
Furthermore, we have shown that any store locates inside the market segment whenever ﬁrms
achieve positive proﬁts. We have also shown that when competition is keen (β large), market
globalization leads to a natural monopoly, i.e., the ﬁrst entrant conducts spatial preemption.
These results are in sharp contrast to spatial price competition. On the other hand, when
competition is weak (β small), ﬁrms establish multiple stores at a certain distance from rival
stores. This is in contrast to spatial Cournot competition, as well as spatial price competition.
Appendix
A1. Existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in variety competition
Suppose ﬁrms A and B locate at na and nb respectively. When store s is sandwiched between
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2(xt−xs)(xs−xr) is a positive constant and hrst(vs) is linear in vs.B e c a u s evai = va
















Since this is concave in va, a unique Nash equilibrium exists.
A2. Endogenous price model
The prices of diﬀerentiated goods are endogenously determined if each good is produced
and sold by a tenant ﬁrm in a monopolistically competitive market. Building on Henkel, Stahl
and Walz (2000), assume that there are a few developers each owning a shopping mall (or
a department store) r at location xr, where there are many tenant ﬁrms. Each tenant ﬁrm
pays rent to developer r,a n ds e l l sad i ﬀerentiated good that is produced with a ﬁxed input
requirement f and a marginal input requirement c.
The proﬁt of a representative tenant v at mall r is given by:
πrv =( prv − c)qrv(b xrs − b xtr) − f − Pr, (A-1)
where s and t are neighboring malls, Pr is the rent at mall r, and the demand for variety v by







We add the last stage of price competition to the games in the text without changing the
earlier stages. For example, the simultaneous (sequential) entry game is now as follows. Devel-
opers simultaneously determine the number of malls nr and the locations of malls r1,r2,...,rn r
at x = xr1,x r2,...,x rnr in the ﬁrst stage(s); developers simultaneously choose the number of
tenant ﬁrms (vr1,v r2,...,v rnr) and set the rent (Pr1,P r2,...,P rnr) such that they absorb all the
proﬁts of tenant ﬁrms in the next stage, and each tenant ﬁrm simultaneously selects the price
of a diﬀerentiated good in the last stage. Seeking SPNE by backward induction, we only need
to compute the last-stage price game.
Since the number of tenant ﬁrms is large enough in each mall, the eﬀect of the price prv of
tenant v in mall r on b xrs and b xtr is negligible. Maximization of proﬁts (A-1) with respect to prv






15for all r and v. Because the price in Eq. (A-2) is constant, the endogenous price model is
reduced to the exogenous price model in the text.
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17Figure 2:  Profits of the first entrant (solid) and the second entrant (broken)
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Figure 1:  Locations of the first entrant (solid) and the second entrant (broken)
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